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Abstract
International tax evasion is a major source of discontent for tax authorities. State
purchases of bank data on suspected tax evaders from international tax havens con-
stitute one tool to combat such tax evasion. Increasing the risks of detection, such
purchases may spur voluntary disclosures for fear of facing charges for tax fraud.
Tax authorities in Germany have made repeated use of this tool in recent years,
above all in North-Rhine Westphalia, Germany’s most populous federal state. Using
self-compiled data for North-Rhine Westphalia on the timing and content of data
acquisitions and on monthly voluntary disclosures of international tax evasion in-
volving Swiss banks, we study the effects that such acquisitions had on the evolution
of voluntary disclosures over time. Our results show that purchases of data on poten-
tial tax evaders had a positive and sizeable effect on voluntary disclosures. Various
robustness checks and additional explorations corroborate this conclusion.
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1 Introduction
International tax evasion has become a major source of discontent for tax authorities
worldwide. Recent evidence produced in Zucman (2013) suggests that about 8% of the
global financial wealth of households is held in tax havens, of which three-quarters goes
unrecorded, and that offshore assets are owned in the main by residents of rich countries,
particularly by Europeans.1 Of these assets (recorded and unrecorded), a large fraction is
held or managed in Europe itself, often in small landlocked Switzerland, a major offshore
financial center and tax haven famous for its strict bank secrecy and data privacy laws.2
Tax havens harm state finances. By facilitating the avoidance or evasion of taxes,
they erode countries’ tax bases and undermine their regulatory and taxation processes.
Lack of information on assets or income located abroad is the most important obstacle for
tax authorities in their fight against tax evasion, for wealth or income that is unrecorded
cannot be taxed. Tax havens, for obvious reasons, are reluctant to share such information
with countries suffering from tax evasion.3 Growing pressure amidst the financial and
economic crisis of 2008/09, however, has led to an explosion of bilateral tax treaties that
provide for an exchange of information between countries. Today, such treaties are the
main policy instrument in the fight against international tax evasion. Recent evidence,
however, suggests that such treaties may not be very effective.4 In part, the problem
is one of design. For such treaties generally require information only to be exchanged
about a named person, ’fishing expeditions’ are prohibited. Furthermore, to be effective,
cooperation of those countries who benefit most from tax evasion is required, that is of tax
1Earlier estimates of household offshore wealth are even larger than the $5.9 trillion in 2008 estimated
by Zucman (2013). They include $6.7 trillion in 2008 (Boston Consulting Group, 2009) and $8.5 trillion
in 2002 (Cap Gemini and Merrill Lynch, 2002). According to Palan et al. (2010), the global rich in 2007
held wealth worth $12 trillion in tax havens.
2According to Boston Consulting Group (2009), about a third of the world’s offshore wealth is in
Switzerland. Zucman (2013) estimates that one third of the global missing wealth can be traced back to
Switzerland (estimated at $1, 545 billions). According to data published by Swiss tax authorities, about
80% of the wealth held by Europeans in Switzerland seems to be evading taxes (Zucman, 2014).
3Strict bank secrecy and data privacy laws are a core feature of tax havens. It is for this reason that
tax havens are also referred to as ”secrecy jurisdictions”.
4Evaluating the G20 tax haven crackdown in 2009, Johannesen and Zucman (2014) produce evidence
that the information exchange treaties forced upon tax havens under the threat of economic sanctions
caused tax evaders to shift deposits to havens not covered by a treaty with their home country, rather than
to repatriate funds.
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havens themselves.
To enforce tax compliance by their citizens, however, governments in recent years relied
not only on bilateral tax agreements for acquiring data on wealth and income located
abroad. Some countries, most notably Germany, acquired such data also unilaterally – by
buying confidential bank data from tax havens offered to them for sale by whistle-blowers,
often former employees of major international banks. Germany’s most populous federal
state, North-Rhine Westphalia, has been particularly active. Since 2010, it has bought data
on ten occasions containing names of suspected tax evaders with accounts in Switzerland.5
Although controversial, both within and outside Germany, the use of such unauthorized
disclosure of information by tax authorities has been accepted by courts in Germany,6 and
it seems to have paid off significantly for the state of NRW. According the Ministry of
Finance of NRW, purchases of data CDs led to an estimated additional tax revenue of two
billion Euros for NRW, a sizeable amount both in absolute and in relative terms.7
State acquisitions of confidential bank data from tax havens increase the risks of de-
tection for tax evaders. This may spur timely voluntary disclosures of tax evaders for fear
of facing criminal charges. Voluntary disclosure programs exist in most OECD countries
(see OECD (2015) for a concise review of existing country-specific programs). Voluntary
disclosure is an act by which a delinquent taxpayer discloses voluntarily information not
previously reported to tax authorities in return for immunity from prosecution for tax
fraud. A voluntary disclosure (essentially an amended tax return) is only possible if tax
authorities have not started investigations into fraud.8 If effective, a tax evader has to pay
the tax liability plus interest and possibly some penalty surcharges, but generally no longer
faces the risk of being prosecuted for tax fraud.9 The effects on voluntary disclosures of
5Information on these purchases of Swiss data is provided in Table A-1 in the appendix.
6See, for example, the New York Times article from April 2, 2012 ”Swiss Seek Arrest of 3 German Tax
Officials Over Stolen Banking Data”. Information on individual court decisions is provided on the official
website of the Ministry of Finance of NRW at http://www.fm.nrw.de/allgemein_fa/steuerzahler/
Steuerhinterziehung/index.php (in German).
7For the whole of Germany (not just for NRW) and for all kinds of voluntary disclosures (not only those
involving untaxed wealth abroad), the additional revenue generated in the same period amounted to four
to five billion Euros.
8It must also be complete and free of error to be effective and guarantee immunity.
9Rules, however, do vary across countries. In particular, not everywhere does a voluntary disclosure
minimise, or eliminate, the risk of criminal prosecution.
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such state-sponsored data purchases, however, have received surprisingly little attention in
the literature. Hardly anything, as a consequence, is known on the effectiveness of such
data acquisitions in helping states to tax hitherto untaxed wealth of domestic residents
held abroad.
Using self-compiled unique data for North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) for the period
January 2010 to November 2015 on the timing and content of state data acquisitions of bank
data from Switzerland and on monthly voluntary disclosures by NRW residents involving
Swiss banks, we study the effects that such acquisitions had on the evolution over time of
voluntary disclosures by NRW residents involving Swiss banks. Our results show that these
exogenous shocks to the probability of detection had a positive and sizeable effect on the
number of voluntary disclosures. Various robustness checks corroborate this conclusion,
as do additional explorations, such as the study of google keyword searches for ”voluntary
disclosure” in Germany. As expected, the latter also show a positive response following
the emergence of a new purchase. Furthermore, and also in line with expectations, this
response both materializes more quickly and exhibits less persistence than the response of
actual disclosures. We also find evidence for a more timely response of voluntary disclosures
to purchases of data from Switzerland which have been linked in the press to specific banks
in Switzerland. This more timely response may be explained by the perceived greater need
of tax evaders to respond quickly by way of voluntary disclosure to such purchases of data,
being faced with a greater and more imminent risk of identification and hence prosecution
by tax authorities.
There is a large body of literature that is of broader relevance to our paper. First,
there are numerous studies on tax evasion by individuals (see Slemrod (2007) for a review
of and introduction to this strand of literature). Theoretical work on individual tax evasion
started with Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) (see Sandmo (2005) for
an overview). Alm (2012) reviews the empirical work on the subject which is – despite
the obvious difficulties in quantifying tax evasion – surprisingly large. Second, there is
also some (although mostly theoretical) literature on temporary tax amnesties programs
(see, for example, Malik and Schwab (1991), or Alm and Beck (1993)), which however differ
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significantly in nature and regulation from permanent voluntary disclosure programs.10 Fi-
nally, and of more immediate relevance to our paper, little work has been done on voluntary
disclosure programs. To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have explored volun-
tary disclosure programs, albeit again predominantly from a theoretical perspective (see
Andreoni (1991) and Langenmayr (2016)). What is more, only one of these studies has in-
quired empirically into the link between state purchases of confidential bank data and state
tax revenues from voluntary disclosures (see Langenmayr (2016)). In a short appendix to
her paper, Langenmayr provides tentative evidence for Germany that changes in detection
risks can increase state tax revenues. Employing a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach
and using the GENESIS data base of the German Federal Statistical Office, Langenmayr
finds that the acquisition of whistle-blower data in February 2010 had a positive effect on
the relative evolution in 2005-2012 of annual self-reported income tax revenue to that of
annual payroll tax revenue. However, several shortcomings beset the analysis. First, there
had been a data purchase already in the pre-treatment period (in 2006), and seven more
data purchases occured in the post-treatment period (2010-2012). Second, self-reported
income tax revenue (the chosen outcome measure) includes not only revenue raised after
all types of voluntary disclosure (including disclosures on assets held domestically), but
also on any type of entrepreneurial income - a sizable and much larger aggregate than
total revenue from voluntary disclosures involving only foreign assets. Finally, tax data
at annual frequency appears inappropriate as a measure of response of tax evaders filing
voluntary disclosures.11 In our empirical analysis, we improve upon these shortcomings in
several ways, which provides for a more convincing identification strategy of the effects of
state data purchases of confidential bank data on voluntary disclosures involving untaxed
wealth held abroad. In our period of investigation (January 2010 to November 2015), we
will consider all data purchases linked to Switzerland and employ a monthly measure of
response (number of voluntary disclosures) that only covers voluntary disclosures involving
Swiss banks.
10Tax amnesties are discretionary, temporary programs (they run for about a quarter), which, unlike
voluntary disclosure programs, usually do not fine tax evaders, are often open also to individuals already
under investigation by tax authorities, and allow also only partial disclosure.
11To be valid, voluntary disclosures require very timely responses of tax evaders in the face of a pend-
ing investigation. Once authorities have started an investigation, tax evaders no longer can become tax
compliant by filing a voluntary disclosure and thereby evade prosecution.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the self-compiled data and the
identification strategy we use in our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents and discusses
our regression results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.1 Data and Summary Statistics
Since January 2010, Germany’s largest federal state North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) is
collecting data on the number of voluntary disclosures involving Swiss banks that are filed
each month by NRW residents.12 Although publicly available from the Ministry of Finance
of NRW, this unique data surprisingly has not yet been used in research of any kind,
economic or other.13 The data set we use in the empirical analysis covers the period January
2010 to November 2015 and consists of two main types of data, (i) the aforementioned
official data on the monthly absolute number of voluntary disclosures involving Swiss banks
made by NRW residents to tax authorities in NRW, and (ii) self-compiled data on the
respective calendar months in which purchases of data on potential tax evaders from NRW
by tax authorities in NRW have been made public in the press.14 We use (i) to construct
our dependent variable and (ii) to construct our explanatory variables of main interest.
Some of our robustness checks and additional explorations make use also of further data,
including data on keyword searches from google trends and monthly exchange rates between
the Euro and the Swiss franc. We defer a discussion of these additional data until we first
make use of them in the analysis.
12Interestingly, NRW does not collect monthly data on the total number of voluntary disclosures, which
include also domestic disclosures and disclosures involving assets in foreign countries other than Switzer-
land. To the best of our knowledge, no similar data is available for any other of the 16 federal states in
Germany.
13The data can be downloaded from the website of the Ministry of Finance at http://www.fm.nrw.de/
allgemein_fa/steuerzahler/Steuerhinterziehung/index.php (in German).
14Data acquisitions have generally not been announced (nor have they been later confirmed) by tax
authorities in NRW. Information on the timing and content of data acquisitions has been compiled from
press items in print and online media. Information on the first press coverage of individual data purchases,
including the exact publication date, is provided in Table A-1 in the appendix.
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Figure 1: Monthly number of voluntary disclosures involving Swiss banks
and calendar months of purchases of Swiss bank data, January 2010 to
November 2015
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Notes: The black curve shows monthly voluntary disclosures involving Swiss banks of NRW residents
to NRW tax authorities in the period January 2010 to November 2015. Zero disclosures were filed in
November 2011 (the only month). The eight grey vertical lines indicate the respective calendar months
in which it became public that a new data CD with information on potential tax evaders holding illicit
wealth in Switzerland has been bought by tax authorities in NRW. Data on monthly voluntary disclosures
stem from the Ministry of Finance of NRW and can be accessed online (see footnote 13 for the link).
Details on individual purchases of data CDs have been compiled by the authors from various press articles
(references for these articles and further information on data purchases is provided in Table A-1 in the
appendix).
Figure 1 plots our raw data for the period January 2010 to November 2015, as published
online by the Ministry of Finance of NRW, on the monthly absolute number of voluntary
disclosures involving Swiss banks made by NRW residents to tax authorities in NRW. Also
documented in Figure 1 are the respective eight calendar months in which the altogether
ten purchases of data over this period by tax authorities in NRW containing information
on potential NRW tax evaders holding illicit wealth in Switzerland have become public.15
15Both in June 2010 and August 2012, two sets of data purchases have been revealed in the press. The
only purchase of data by tax authorities in NRW which did not involve Swiss banks (bank data from
Luxembourg, made public in the press in October 2011) is not shown in Figure 1. For details on individual
purchases of Swiss data, see Table A-1 in the appendix.
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Three major insights may be gained from Figure 1. First, the evolution over time of the
absolute number of voluntary disclosures involving Swiss banks made by NRW residents to
tax authorities in NRW roughly follows a U-shaped pattern. After a peak in early 2010 (in
April), voluntary disclosures decline rapidly, then remain relatively constant at low numbers
in 2011 and the first half of 2012, and begin to rise again from 2013 onwards (from the
second quarter of 2014, however, this rise looses pace and eventually levels off, despite a
marked, albeit short-lived, resurgence in January 2015). Second, the surge in voluntary
disclosures in January 2015 is surprising, as the rules governing voluntary disclosures were
significantly tightened from January 1st, 2015. Many, including NRW’s Finance Minister,
had predicted a marked drop in voluntary disclosures for January 2015 (from their level in
December 2014). Evidently, this drop did not materialize. Instead, voluntary disclosures
surged in January 2015. Third, and of greatest relevance for our research question, the
monthly number of voluntary disclosures appear to increase significantly in the first few
months after data purchases have become public, but show no local hike immediately before
such purchases emerge. This pattern in relative time (not calendar time) is suggestive of a
sizeable and time-limited effect of data acquisitions on voluntary disclosures.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
To identify the effect of purchases by NRW tax authorities of Swiss bank data on the
number of voluntary disclosures by NRW residents, we estimate variants of the following
equation:
yt = α + yeart +
z∑
i=1
γi ×monthit +
n∑
j=−1
βj × datat+j + εt, (1)
where yt is the log of the number of monthly voluntary disclosures (plus one
16) involving
Swiss banks made by NRW residents to tax authorities in NRW in calendar month t, yeart
is a full set of year dummies,
∑z
i=1month
i
t is a polynomial of degree z in (monthly) calendar
16In November 2011, zero disclosures were filed. For this reason, we take the log only after adding one
to each monthly disclosure observation.
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time, and
∑n=5
j=−1 datat+j is a set of indicator variables capturing whether the current period
(calendar month) t is leading a data purchase by one month, coinciding with a period of
data purchase, or lagging a period of data purchase by one to n months. In the empirical
analysis, we choose n, i.e. the number of lags, to equal 5. Finally, εt is an error term.
The treatment effect of interest are the βj coefficients, for j ≥ 0. They capture the
contemporaneous (j = 0) and delayed responses (j > 0) of voluntary disclosures to a
data purchase. The coefficient β−1 on our indicator for the month before a new purchase
has emerged captures any anticipatory effects on voluntary disclosures. β−1 should be
statistically indistinguishable from zero if our dating of the emergence of purchases is
correct and emergences in the press are indeed shocks that change the information set
and detection risk of potential tax evaders. The set of year dummies yeart controls for
level changes in voluntary disclosures between different calendar years, and the polynomial
of degree z in (monthly) calendar time
∑z
i=1month
i
t controls in a flexible way for any
underlying monthly trend affecting the evolution of voluntary disclosures over time, as
could be caused, for instance, by trend changes in the efficiency of tax authorities, in
economic conditions, or in tax honesty. In the empirical analysis, we consider z ∈ {0, 1, 2},
i.e. no monthly trend of any kind, a linear monthly trend, and a linear-quadratic trend.
The latter is the most flexible specification, and arguably also the most suitable for our
purposes, given the U-shaped evolution of voluntary disclosures over time (see Figure 1).
Throughout, we use robust standard errors.
3 Results
Table 1 reports the main regression output of four different specifications of equation 1 in
Section 2.2.17 The first three specifications differ only in the type of underlying monthly
trend considered in the analysis. Specification (I) considers no monthly trend of any kind,
17The endogenous variable in all four specifications is the log of the monthly absolute number of voluntary
disclosures involving Swiss banks made by NRW residents to tax authorities in NRW. All four specifications
furthermore contain as regressors a set of year dummies for 2011-2015 (base year is 2010) and a set of
indicator variables that capture systematic deviations in relative time (and not in calendar time) of the
log of monthly voluntary disclosures in the vicinity of a month in which a new data purchase by the tax
authorities in NRW has been made public in the press.
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specification (II) a linear monthly trend, and specification (III) a linear-quadratic monthly
trend. Being the most flexible, specification (III) will constitute our baseline specification
that we later use both for robustness checks and additional explorations (see Tables 2 and
3, as well as the right diagram in Figure 2).
As it turns out, the estimated coefficient βˆ−1 of the lead variable datat−1 is insignificant
in all three specifications. This lack of a pre-treatment effect is reassuring, as it suggests
no anticipatory effects on monthly disclosures prior to the month in which a data purchase
has been made public in the news.18 The immediate response of voluntary disclosures to
the emergence of a new data purchase in month t, given by the estimated coefficient βˆ0
of datat, is positive and of much larger magnitude than βˆ−1 of the lead variable datat−1,
although also imprecisely estimated in the first two specifications. Finally, and in all three
specifications, estimated coefficients βˆ+1 through βˆ+5 on the remaining set of indicator
variables datat+1 to datat+5 show a strong positive and hump-shaped response of monthly
voluntary disclosures in the first four months after a new data purchase by tax authorities in
NRW has been made public in the press. In our most flexible specification (III), voluntary
disclosures are on average 1.265 log points higher, which translates into an increase of 254%,
in the first month after a new data acquisition has emerged compared to what they would
have been, had no such purchase taken place, and still 1.138 log points (212%) higher in the
second month after news of a new data purchase.19 In the third and fourth month after the
emergence of a new data purchase, a sizeable (yet also smaller) positive effect on disclosures
is still observable; only in the fifth month do voluntary disclosures cease to show signs of a
systematic positive response. Voluntary disclosures hence appear to react strongly to news
of purchases of bank data that could identify potential tax evaders holding untaxed wealth
in Swiss bank accounts. Observable in all three specifications, this hump-shaped pattern
is robust to the way we model any underlying monthly trend in voluntary disclosures that
may arise from changes in unobservables over time. The left diagram in Figure 2 illustrates
the findings of our baseline specification (III) graphically.
18The lack of a pre-treatment effect also suggests that our news-based dating of the month in which a
data purchase has been made public does not suffer from systematic mis-measurement in the form of too
late a recording of the month in which information on a new purchase actually became available.
19Percentage effects are obtained from the transformation: % change = (eβˆi − 1)× 100.
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Table 1: Main Regression Results
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
datat−1 0.249
(0.300)
∗∗∗ 0.305
(0.310)
∗∗∗ 0.300
(0.259)
∗∗∗ 0.248
(0.259)
∗∗∗
datat 0.361
(0.318)
∗∗∗ 0.334
(0.298)
∗∗∗ 0.435
(0.249)
∗∗∗
datat × (≤ 2 weeks) -0.061
(0.236)
∗∗∗
datat × (> 2 weeks) 0.735
(0.272)
∗∗∗
datat+1 1.035
(0.333)
∗∗∗ 0.974
(0.298)
∗∗∗ 1.265
(0.290)
∗∗∗ 1.229
(0.287)
∗∗∗
datat+2 0.720
(0.316)
∗∗∗ 0.781
(0.267)
∗∗∗ 1.138
(0.276)
∗∗∗ 1.133
(0.276)
∗∗∗
datat+3 0.701
(0.205)
∗∗∗ 0.667
(0.208)
∗∗∗ 0.837
(0.225)
∗∗∗ 0.846
(0.221)
∗∗∗
datat+4 0.506
(0.267)
∗∗∗ 0.604
(0.236)
∗∗∗ 0.788
(0.199)
∗∗∗ 0.804
(0.207)
∗∗∗
datat+5 0.053
(0.295)
∗∗∗ 0.103
(0.287)
∗∗∗ 0.268
(0.244)
∗∗∗ 0.257
(0.241)
∗∗∗
year indicators (2011-2015) yes yes yes yes
monthly trend (linear) no yes no no
monthly trend (linear-quadratic) no no yes yes
R2 0.63 0.69 0.75 0.76
Notes: The endogenous variable is the log of the monthly number of voluntary disclosures submitted
by residents of NRW which involve illicit wealth held in Switzerland. Dummy variable datat takes the
value one if it became public in period t that tax authorities in NRW had bought a new data CD with
potential tax evaders. Dummy variable datat−1 brings forward this information by one month to account
for potential anticipatory effects, and dummy variables datat+1 to datat+5 capture the (the possibly
highly non-linear) response over time of voluntary disclosures to news reports of a new data purchase on
potential tax evaders with illicit wealth in Switzerland. All regressions include year dummies (base year
is 2010). The estimation sample comprises voluntary disclosures submitted in the months January 2010
to November 2015. Sample size in all regressions is 71. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are used.
On several occasions, news of a new data purchase emerged only late in a calendar
month, which left tax evaders possibly too little time (days) to file a voluntary disclosure
in that same month.20 In our analysis so far, we have disregarded this heterogeneity, which
may explain (at least in part), why the contemporaneous effect of news of a new data
purchase is positive but less precisely estimated. To investigate this possibility, we re-run
a slightly changed variant of our baseline specification (III). This new specification (IV) is
20In three out of the eight calendar months in which a new purchase of data became public, the news of
such a data acquisition emerged only in the last two weeks of the respective calendar month. Exact dates
of the emergence of individual data acquisitions are provided in Table A-1 in the appendix.
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Figure 2: Graphical Representation of Treatment Leads and Lags (Baseline
Specification, Specification Using Bank Information)
t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
0
1
2
3
t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
0
1
2
3
Notes: Left diagram: Plotted estimates are from our baseline specification, as reported in column (III)
of Table 1. Right diagram: Plotted estimates are from a regression that uses two sets of dummy variables
datak,t+j , with j ∈ {−1, 0, 1, ..., 5} and k ∈ {1, 2}, one for purchases known to implicate specific Swiss
banks (k = 1, shown in black), and one for purchases that were not (k = 2, shown in grey), but that is
otherwise identical to our baseline specification. Point estimates in both diagrams are marked by a dot,
and the vertical bands indicate the 95% confidence interval of each estimate.
identical to specification (III) but uses two dummies (datat × (≤ 2 weeks) and datat × (>
2 weeks)) instead of one (datat) for the month in which it became public that a new
data CD with potential tax evaders has been bought by tax authorities in NRW. Dummy
datat× (≤ 2 weeks) is equal to one when two weeks or less within such a month remain for
potential tax evaders to file a disclosure, and zero otherwise. Dummy datat× (> 2 weeks),
in turn, equals one if more than two weeks remain, and zero otherwise.21 Given that it
takes time to file a disclosure, we would expect news on a new data purchase to exert a
stronger positive effect on absolute monthly disclosures if such news break early rather than
late within a calendar month, i.e. the estimated coefficient on datat × (> 2 weeks) should
be positive and larger than that on datat × (≤ 2 weeks). As shown in the last column of
Table 1, our regression results are consistent with this conjecture. Furthermore, estimated
coefficients on our lead and five lags variables, i.e. on datat+i for i = 0, show the same
hump-shaped response of voluntary disclosures to news of a new data purchase. In fact,
estimated coefficients differ little in magnitude from those of the baseline specification.
21Two data acquisitions became public in the same calendar month in June 2010 (on the 9th and one
the 24th) and in August 2012 (on the 8th and on the 22nd). In each case, we classify the respective month
based on the earlier date.
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We conduct several further tests to assess the robustness of our findings. First, we
trim our estimation sample by omitting the first 7, respectively the last 11 and the last
14 months of our observation period (January 2010 to November 2015). Our observation
period starts in January 2010, just one month prior to the first data CD purchase we
record, a purchase that furthermore saw the largest absolute rise in voluntary disclosures
in our data. Omitting the first seven months (January to July 2010) from the estimation
sample allows us to check the robustness of our results to the omission of this first data
purchase and the marked global peak in voluntary disclosures we observe in its vicinity. By
omitting the last 11 months of our observation period, in turn, we effectively omit all 2015
observations (January 2015 to November 2015). This restriction provides for a more homo-
geneous policy environment, as rules for voluntary disclosures were significantly tightened
and fines increased from 2015. Finally, omitting the last 14 months from our observation
period (October 2014 to November 2015) provides not only for a more homogenous policy
environment by excluding all moths from 2015, but also helps to asses whether the last
months of 2014, i.e. the last months under the old policy regime, differed somehow from
preceding months because tax evaders, in anticipation of the approaching tightening of
the rules for voluntary disclosures, filed in larger numbers a voluntary disclosure so as to
become tax compliant still under the old ”lower cost” policy regime. As shown in Table
2, however, our finding of a positive and hump-shaped response in the monthly number
of voluntary disclosures proves robust to such alterations in the starting, respectively end
points of our observation period.
Second, we add to the set of regressors in our baseline specification the log (mean)
monthly exchange rate between the Swiss franc and the euro. The CHF/EUR rate has
seen some major changes in our period of analysis.22 The Swiss franc appreciated steadily
22Floating against the euro, the Swiss franc appreciated steadily against the euro in 2010 and the first
half of 2011, increasingly harming Swiss exporters. To halt this rise of the Swiss franc, the Swiss National
Bank (SNB) introduced a peg in September 2011, intended to prevent the euro from trading below 1.20
Swiss francs. However, as the outlook for the euro darkened, the policy of defending the peg became
increasingly costly for the SNB. Without prior notice, on 15 January 2015, the SNB stunned markets by
abandoning the currency peg, which caused the Swiss franc to soar immediately and strongly against the
euro. In our observation period, the monthly exchange rate between the Swiss franc and the euro averaged
1.22 CHF/EUR (standard variation of 0.10). It was lowest in April 2015 (1.04 CHF/EUR) and highest in
January 2010 (1.48 CHF/EUR).
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Table 2: Robustness Checks I (Trimmed Samples)
Baseline Trimmed sample, excluding:
specification t ≤ 7 t ≥ T − 11 t ≥ T − 14
(1)∗∗∗ (2)∗∗∗ (3)∗∗∗ (4)∗∗∗
datat−1 0.300
(0.259)
∗∗∗ 0.405
(0.283)
∗∗∗ 0.104
(0.247)
∗∗∗ 0.161
(0.237)
∗∗∗
datat 0.435
(0.249)
∗∗∗ 0.427
(0.246)
∗∗∗ 0.384
(0.302)
∗∗∗ 0.617
(0.264)
∗∗∗
datat+1 1.265
(0.290)
∗∗∗ 1.171
(0.313)
∗∗∗ 1.093
(0.242)
∗∗∗ 1.114
(0.222)
∗∗∗
datat+2 1.138
(0.276)
∗∗∗ 1.086
(0.269)
∗∗∗ 0.982
(0.233)
∗∗∗ 1.037
(0.232)
∗∗∗
datat+3 0.837
(0.225)
∗∗∗ 0.912
(0.189)
∗∗∗ 0.751
(0.224)
∗∗∗ 0.747
(0.231)
∗∗∗
datat+4 0.788
(0.199)
∗∗∗ 0.868
(0.183)
∗∗∗ 0.688
(0.215)
∗∗∗ 0.607
(0.214)
∗∗∗
datat+5 0.268
(0.244)
∗∗∗ 0.330
(0.248)
∗∗∗ 0.259
(0.226)
∗∗∗ 0.293
(0.199)
∗∗∗
year indicators (2011-2014) no no yes yes
year indicators (2011-2015) yes yes no no
monthly trend (linear-quadratic) yes yes yes yes
R2 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.81
N 71 64 60 57
Notes: Column (1) re-produces the results from our baseline specification (III) in Table 1. Column (2)
omits the first seven months from the observation period (i.e January to July 2010)), column (3) omits
all months from 2015, and column (4) omits all months after September 2014. Otherwise, estimations
samples, specifications and covariates considered in these regressions are identical to those of our baseline
specification (III) of Table 1 (see notes to Table 1). ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are used.
against the euro throughout 2010 and most of 2011 (until the introduction of a peg to the
euro in September 2011) and soared sharply in January 2015, when the Swiss National Bank
(SNB) without prior notice and to the surprise of market participants suddenly abandoned
the peg. The sharp appreciation of the Swiss franc may have affected the number of
voluntary disclosures, which increased strongly, yet only temporarily, in January 2015.
As shown in column (2) of Table 3, however, the CHF/EUR rate has an insignificant
(albeit positive) effect on the number of voluntary disclosures per month. As such, there
is little evidence that the marked rise in disclosures from December 2014 to January 2015,
a surprising and unexpected development given the tightening of the rules for voluntary
disclosure in January 2015, was driven by this change in the CHF/EUR exchange rate.
The data purchase in December 2014 together with the hump-shaped response of voluntary
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disclosures we find to such purchases in our data, however, can explain this local hike in
voluntary disclosures at the beginning of 2015. In any case, our key finding again proves
robust, i.e. voluntary disclosures continue to show a hump-shaped response to news of a
data purchase by tax authorities in NRW. In fact, the pattern of this response differs only
little from that in our baseline specification (reported again, for convenience, in column (1)
of Table 3).
Third, we add to our baseline set of regressors a dummy variable, which takes value
zero before November 2012, and value one from November 2012, to capture any level
effect on voluntary disclosures of the failure on November 23rd 2012 of a long-awaited
tax treaty between Germany and Switzerland in Germany’s upper legislative chamber, the
Bundesrat. The accord aimed to ensure the equal treatment of the wealth of German
citizens, whether located in Germany or in Switzerland, and to restore tax equity for the
past by means of a lump sum tax payment.23 The failure of the tax treaty meant that
voluntary disclosure was to remain the only option available to Germans to legalize their
untaxed assets in Switzerland, i.e. become tax compliant, and escape prosecution for tax
evasion. It is possible that some tax evaders refrained from disclosing undeclared wealth
in Switzerland because they awaited the tax agreement to take force. If so, its failure may
have spurred voluntary disclosures. As seen in column (3) of Table 3, we do indeed find
evidence for a positive effect of the failure of the German-Swiss tax agreement on voluntary
disclosures. Our core finding, however, proves robust once again. Voluntary disclosures still
show a hump-shaped response to the emergence of new data purchases by tax authorities
in NRW.
We also conducted a number of additional explorations. First, we obtained a measure
from Google trends of the relative search frequency in Germany in our observation period of
the German keyword ’Selbstanzeige’ (voluntary disclosure) and used the log of this measure
as dependent variable in our baseline specification to see whether data purchases by tax
23Under the agreement, planned to take effect on January 1st 2013, undeclared wealth of Germans in
Switzerland over the last 10 years would have been taxed at a rate of between 21 and 41 percent, and tax
evaders would have remained anonymous. From 2013, they would have been be taxed at normal German
rates. Similar Swiss accords (withholding tax deals) had been signed, for example, with Austria and the
U.K.
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authorities in NRW spurred public interest in voluntary disclosures.24 Increased keyword
searches may stem from tax evaders which, shocked by news of a new data purchase, seek
information on how to file a timely disclosure. If so, news of a new data purchase should
have a positive effect on keyword searches for voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, such a
positive effect should materialize more quickly (following the emergence of a new purchase)
and show less persistence than the effect on actual disclosures. As shown in column (4) of
Table 3, all three predictions find empirical support. Keyword searches from Germany for
voluntary disclosure in Google do respond positively to news of a new data purchases, and
this response is both more immediate and less persistent than that of voluntary disclosures
(see baseline estimates, re-produced in column (1) of Table 3). Of course, this auxiliary
piece of evidence is only suggestive, since we do not know if it is indeed tax evaders who
account for this increase in keyword searches. The time structure of the effect (i.e. an
immediate and short-lived response), however, is supportive of such an interpretation and
also consistent with a causal interpretation of our core finding on the evolution of actual
disclosures following a new data acquisition.
Second, we differentiate in our baseline specification between purchases of data from
Switzerland which have been linked in the press to specific banks in Switzerland and
purchases which have not.25 A priori, it is unclear which type of data purchase generates
more voluntary disclosures. In the former case, a smaller absolute number of tax evaders
is potentially at risk of being identified by the tax authorities. However, this smaller group
is also facing a much more elevated risk of detection, given that it is their Swiss bank
from which tax authorities in NRW have allegedly acquired data. To explore this question
empirically, we replace in our baseline specification the set of dummy variables datat+j,
24Google trends does not provide monthly information on the relative search frequency at the level of
individual federal states in Germany. We therefore use information for the whole of Germany. Data on a
keyword search from Google are normalized by the absolute number of search queries in the geographical
region of interest to remove any trends from growth in internet usage or from changes in the relative
popularity of Google as a search engine. The normalized data are then rescaled to an index with a
maximum value of 100. In our observation period, the average value of the index for the keyword search
’Selbstanzeige’ (voluntary disclosure) was 18.4 (s.d. 15.8) with a minimum of 9 and a maximum (by
construction) of 100.
25Of the altogether 10 purchases, which were made public in the news in eight different calendar months
(multiple purchases occured in two months), seven purchases (in six calendar months) were known to affect
certain Swiss banks. Purchases emerging in June 2010 and December 2014 were publicized to involve Swiss
accounts, but did not name any particular Swiss bank. For more details, See Table A-1 in the appendix.
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Table 3: Robustness Checks II (Exchange Rate, German-Swiss Tax Agree-
ment) and Additional Explorations (Google Trends)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
datat−1 0.300
(0.259)
∗∗∗ 0.293
(0.257)
∗∗∗ 0.317
(0.270)
∗∗∗ -0.112
(0.135)
∗∗∗
datat 0.435
(0.249)
∗∗∗ 0.418
(0.246)
∗∗∗ 0.475
(0.256)
∗∗∗ 0.568
(0.225)
∗∗∗
datat+1 1.265
(0.290)
∗∗∗ 1.199
(0.314)
∗∗∗ 1.269
(0.285)
∗∗∗ 0.370
(0.127)
∗∗∗
datat+2 1.138
(0.276)
∗∗∗ 1.100
(0.304)
∗∗∗ 1.142
(0.269)
∗∗∗ 0.218
(0.210)
∗∗∗
datat+3 0.837
(0.225)
∗∗∗ 0.803
(0.246)
∗∗∗ 0.742
(0.218)
∗∗∗ 0.176
(0.103)
∗∗∗
datat+4 0.788
(0.199)
∗∗∗ 0.743
(0.244)
∗∗∗ 0.590
(0.193)
∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.113)
∗∗∗
datat+5 0.268
(0.244)
∗∗∗ 0.252
(0.251)
∗∗∗ 0.165
(0.269)
∗∗∗ -0.117
(0.109)
∗∗∗
CHF/EUR exchange rate (in logs) 3.417
(5.993)
∗∗∗
tax agreement failure 0.858
(0.441)
∗∗∗
R2 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.67
Notes: Column (1) re-produces the results from our baseline specification (III) in Table 1. Column
(2) reports results when we add the log of the EUR/CHF exchange rate to the set of regressors in our
baseline specification, and column (3) results when we add a dummy variable that takes value one from
November 2012 (and zero before that month). Finally, column (4) reports results from our baseline
specification when we use as dependent variable the log of the monthly relative search frequency in
Google for the German keyword ’Selbstanzeige’ (voluntary disclosure) in Germany in our observation
period (January 2010 to November 2015). Estimations samples, specifications and covariates considered
in these regressions are otherwise identical to those of our baseline specification (III) of Table 1 (see notes
to Table 1). In particular, all regressions include year dummies (base year is 2010) and a second-order
polynomial in time (calendar months). Sample size in all regressions is 71. ***, **, * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are used.
where j ∈ {−1, 0, 1, ..., 5}, with two such sets datak,t+j, one for purchases which are known
to involve data from specific Swiss banks (k = 1), and one for purchases that are not
(k = 2). Estimated coefficients on these two sets of dummy variables are plotted in the
right diagram of Figure 2.26 As is evident, voluntary disclosures in the aftermath of both
type of purchases do show a hump-shaped response, but one that differs somewhat in shape
and magnitude, not only between these two types of purchases, but also from the estimated
structure of response to a data purchase (of any kind) in our baseline regression (see left
diagram in Figure 2. A data purchase known to involve specific Swiss banks (black line)
exerts a statistically significant positive effect (at the 5% level of significance) already from
26The full tabulated regression output is available from the authors upon request.
16
the very month it emerged (unlike in our baseline regression), whereas no such significant
contemporaneous effect emerges for the subgroup of purchases of bank data which were
publicized without implicating specific financial institutions (grey line). This more timely
response may be explained by the greater need of tax evaders to respond quickly by way
of voluntary disclosure as they face a greater and more imminent risk of identification and
hence prosecution by tax authorities following such a purchase. Reassuringly, for both
subgroups of purchases, the estimated lead coefficient on datak,t−1 is again insignificant,
which speaks against anticipatory effects of any kind also at level of these subgroups of
purchase types, and any positive stimuli provided by these data acquisitions again has fully
faded out 5 months after a purchase had become public.
4 Conclusion
International tax evasion is a major concern to policy makers and tax authorities. Lack
of information on domestically owned assets held abroad is at the heart of states’ inability
to enforce tax compliance of its citizens. Tax havens, for obvious reasons, are reluctant to
share information on unrecorded wealth with countries suffering from tax evasion. This
hampers the effectiveness of bilateral tax treaties. By acquiring confidential bank data
from tax havens, however, countries suffering from tax evasion may identify (at least) some
tax evaders and furthermore increase risks of detection for all those domestic residents
who hold untaxed wealth abroad. What is more, this policy tool is subject only to own
discretion, and hence can be used unilaterally by countries suffering from tax evasion.
In this paper, we investigated the discretionary and unilateral use of such state-sponsored
data purchases to identify untaxed wealth held abroad. For this purpose, we compiled and
analysed information on data acquisitions involving Swiss banks by tax authorities from
Germany’s most populous federal state, North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), in the years 2010
through 2015, and on monthly voluntary disclosures made by NRW residents over this
period. Our results strongly suggest that such data purchases have been effective in pro-
moting tax compliance by inducing tax evaders to identify themselves and declare untaxed
assets by way of voluntary disclosure. Various robustness checks corroborate this conclu-
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sion, as do additional explorations. State purchases of confidential bank data from tax
havens hence appear to be a valuable additional policy tool for governments in their fight
against international tax evasion. We also found evidence that the failure of a prospective
tax agreement between Germany and Switzerland spurred voluntary disclosures, which is
suggestive that the two are seen at least as partial substitutes by tax evaders.
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A Appendix
Table A-1: Data Sources for Individual CD Purchases
First made public Allegedly Involved Bank
CD on by bank source
1 2010–02–04 HB (2010) Credit Suisse HB (2010)
2a 2010–06–09 Stern (2010) −/− −/−
2b 2010–06–24 SPON (2010) −/− −/−
3 2010–10–17 Spiegel (2010)a Julius Ba¨r Zeit Online (2010)
4 2012–07–13 Stern (2012) Coutts Stern (2012)
5a 2012–08–08 HB (2012) UBS & an unknown bank HB (2012)
5b 2012–08–22 MM (2012) Julius Ba¨r MM (2012)
6 2013–04–16 FAZ (2013)
Neue Aargauer Bank, Clar-
iden Leu, Credit Suisse
FAZ (2013)
7 2014–01–12 SPON (2014) Leumi SPON (2014)
8 2014–12–20 BamS (2014) −/− −/−
Note: a Information was released one day before publication of the print issue.
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07–13.
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2010–10–17.
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